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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

FUTURE INTERESTS-POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-MAY CREDITOR-APPOINTEE OF TESTATOR RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO
APPOINT IN ANY FUTURE WILL-Plaintiff made a contract with the donee of
a power of appointment granted in these words: "I give and beque ath the principal of said trust fund unto such person or persons anc;l in such estates, interests
and proportions as the said Clarence C. Appleton shall in and by ]lis Last Will
and Testament in that behalf appoint. I give the said Clarence C. Appleton this
power of disposition in order to enable him to make such legacies as he may
desire, to his heirs, relatives, friends, or for charity." The donee agreed to execute and did execute a will in which he appointed to the plaintiff trust company
a sum equal to the amount of a preexisting debt owed by him to the plaintiff.
He further agreed that as often as he might make and execute a new will, he
would incorporate therein a like appointment. Subsequently, he revoked that will
and executed a new one in which he exercised his power of appointment by giving the whole fund to his son and daughter; he then died _insolvent. Plaintiff
brings this action for damages for breach of contract. Held, though the deceased's creditors, including the plaintiff, may look to the appointed property for
payment of any balance due them after the decedent's own estate is exhausted,
the complainant cannot recover upon his contract. United States Trust Co. of
Newark v. Montclair Trust Co., (N. J. Eq. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 901.
The unanimous opinion of the American courts seems to be that there may
be no recovery in damages for breach of a contract to exercise a testamentary
power of appointment in a particular manner.1 A problem which precedes that
of the application of the proper substantive law and one which is raised, but not
very fully discussed, in the principal case is that of construction. What language
0

1 Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E. (2d) 487 (1938); Kent v.
Thornton, 179 Misc. 593, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 435 (1942) and the principal case. See
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 340 (1940). The English decisions are to the contrary.
In re Parkin, [1892] 3 Ch. 510; Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Dr. & Sm. 365, 62 Eng. Rep.
660 (1865); In re Collard and Duckworth, 16 Ont. Rep. 735 (18~9).
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creates a general power? Before the express language of various instruments is
considered, it is necessary to delimit somewhat the scope of the question. Though
frequently judges and text writers attempt to define powers as merely general
or special,2 the problem-solving value of such a definition is questionable for it
is quite within the realm of legal possibility that a power might be regarded as
general for one purpose and not for another. 3 One of the purposes of such a
classification is the determination of what property may become liable for the
debts of an insolvent donee. The general rule is that property passing under a
general power of appointment is subject to the claims of the creditors of an
insolvent donee. 4 As is the case in any other construction problem, the courts, in
construing the instrument creating the power of appointment, say that their first
task is the carrying out of the donor's intent.5 The analysis of the donor's intent,
however, is not directed to the determination of who should actually take but is
directed to whether equitable principles, which are the basis of the creditors'
rights, are applicable to the particular power. 6 The explanation of the creditors'
rights which seems most logical is that equity refuses to be bound by the conventional theories of devolution of appointed property; it recognizes that the
policy of our legal system is to afford relief to creditors before a volunteer may
enjoy any benefits which might have been utilized by the insolvent donee in the
payment of his just debts.7 The question, then, might be rephrased: What language of the donor will the courts construe as having given the donee a right
to exercise the power in his own behalf? 8 In the first place, the donor may give
2

The court finally concluded that the statement following the grant of the general
testamentary power was merely one giving the motive of the testatrix in making the
legacy, or, at best, precatory words having no legal significance.
·
3
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 320 (1940); KALES, ESTATES FUTURE INTEREST,
zd ed., § 609 (1920); Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9 A.
(zd) 311 (1940); Curran's Estate, 312 Pa. 416, 167 A. 597 (1933).
4 I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 246 (1936).
6
Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Stratton v. U.S., (C.C.A. 1st, 1931)
50 F. (zd) 48, cert. denied 284 U.S. 651, 52 S. Ct. 31 (1931); Johnson v. Cushing,
15 N.H. 298 (1844); cases collected in 59 A.L.R. 1510 (1929), 97 A.L.R. 1071
(1935), 121 A.L.R. 803 (1939).
6
4 KENT, CoMMENTARIES, 14th ed., 345 (1896); 3 PAGE, WILLS, 3rd ed., §
1319 (1941). Pennebaker Home for Girls v. Board of Directors, 250 Ky. 44, 61 S.W.
(zd) 883 (1933); Frank v. Frank, 305 ill. 181,137 N.E. 151 (1922); Lewis's Estate,
269 Pa. 379, 112 A. 454 (1921).
7
Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. zoo (1879); Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N.H. 298
(1844); Freeman's Admr. v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, z6 S.E. 845 (1897); Jackson v.
Franklin, 179 Ga. 840, 177 S.E. 731 (1934).
8 The term "general power of appointment" when used with reference to the right
of the creditors of the donee would seem to have a somewhat broader field of reference
than it would have when used in reference to a problem arising under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, for example. Whether the donee is given absolute discretion as to the
appointee or is restricted to a person or persons whom a third person does not disapprove
may be of significance in determining whether property is freely alienable but of none
in determining the rights of creditors.
For other possible explanations of the right of creditors of a donee to share in appointed property, see: 3 PAGE, WILLS, 3rd ed., § 1334 (1941); 1 SIMES, FUTURE
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to the donee unrestricted choice as to his appointees.9 Here the power exists in
its broadest form. The donee may designate a charity, or his wife, or his friend,
or a total stranger as the recipient of these assets. He may even designate himself
and become the owner in fact. It would seem that this power is general in whatever context the term is employed; yet several states reject the general rule and
hold that, in spite of this language, the creditors of the donee may obtain no
rights in the appointed property.10 In the second place, the donor can restrict the
type of instrument by which the power is to be exercised. He can so create it
that the donee must exercise it, if at all, by his will. The decision of the donee
as to the best exercise thereof is thereby subject to change until such donee's
death.11 Such a restriction is not said to make the power special for it is concerned with the conditions under which it is to be exercised, not with the persons
who are to take; but, so far as creditors are concerned, such language has been
held to destroy any rights which they might have acquired in the appointed
property.12 Thirdly, the language of the instrument creating the power may be
such as to grant a general power of appointment followed by qualifying clauses
which suggest a number of alternative beneficiaries.13 These subsequent limiting
claus~s may be regarded as either precatory words which indicate the donor's
wish or desire, or th~y may be considered as expressions of the donor's motive or
purpose in creating the power. In either case, they should be treated as mere
INTERESTS; § 265 (1936); Richard R. B. Powell, "Powers of Appointment," IO
BROOKLYN L. REV. 233 (1941).
9 In Appeal of Beck, II6 Pa. St. 547, 9 A. 942 (1887) the will read: "I do hereby
give •.. unto my executor .•. full and unlimited power and authority to appropriate
or dispose of all .•• my estate .•. to such objects, persons or institutions as in his discretion shall be best and proper."
10 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 A. 531 (1928);
St. Matthews Bank v. DeCharette, 259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W. (2d) 471 (1935); Prince
de .Beam v. Winans, III Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909); Commonwealth v. Duffield,
12 Pa. St. 277 (1849). See also note in II CoL. L. REv. 663 (19II).
11 Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256 (1938); Kent v. Thornton, 179
Misc. 593 (1942).
12 Leser V:• Burnet, (C.C.A. 4th, 1931) 46 F. (2d) 756; Wales' Admr. v. Bowdish's Exr., 61 Vt. 23, 17 A. 1000 (1888); Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A.
16 (1888); In re Howald's Trust, 65 Ohio App. 191, 29 N. E. (2d) 575 (1941).
The language of the will in the last above-cited case is typical: "(c) Said Marie Elizabeth Rowald shall have the power to dispose of one-half of this trust fund by will and
upon her death my trustee is directed to make such disposition of said one-half of the
trust fund as her will may provide" (p. 194).
It should be noted that the language of this will and that of the one in Appeal of
Beck, II6 Pa. St. 547 (1887) mentioned at note 9, supra, involve no real problem of
construction. However, the substantive law of creditors' rights applicable to them show
that, for some purposes, at least, and in some states, the term "general power'' does not
comprehend legal relationships which the term embraces in other states; therefore these
examples are included as the first of a series of progressive restrictions upon the breadth
of the donee's choice of appointees, which are not so exacting as to cause the power
to be considered special but which are sufficiently restricted to limit the operation of
the equitable principles giving rise to the creditor's rights.
13 E.g., the principal case.
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surplusage-ine:ffective limitations upon the primary grant of a general power.14
In the fourth class are those powers which are exercisable upon a condition, e.g.,
the consent of a third person. The problem of construction has somewhat perplexed the English courts.15 The test would seem to be: Does the trustee or other
third person owe any duty, to the takers in default or to anyone other than the
donee, to actively approve or disapprove the selection of the one having the appointive power? When the language of the instrument merely gives the trustee
a veto power, the power would seem to be general, whereas the imposition of
some active duty of selection would, in all probability, cause the power to be
considered special. This construction seems justified when it is noted that the
donee could in the first case exercise the power in favor of himself or his creditors
and the third person would be under no legal obligation to oppose such an appointment. In the latter case the group in whose favor the power could be
exercised would be restricted by the possibly conflicting judgment of the third
person. He, in all probability, would be very unwilling to select creditors of
the donee because of the fear that one of the disappointed takers in default or
heirs of the donor would seek to hold him liable for breach of trust. Included in
a final category are those powers in which the language describes a group of
which the donee is a member but which is subject to some restrictive limitation.
The significance of the problem of construction is nowhere better illustrated
than in these cases. Logically there is no basis of distinction between a grant of
a power to be exercised in favor of anyone other than certain named persons of
whom the donee is not one, and a power to appoint to named persons among
whom is the donee. Theoretically the same classes could be indicated through
the use of either the inclusionary or exclusionary language and the most widely
adopted definition, taken literally, would include both powers as general. Experience, however, shows that the group to which the exclusionary language has
reference is generally very small, frequently but a single person. 16 The latter
language has been held, then, to give the donee a general power which can be
14
3 JARMAN, WILLS, 7th ed., p. 2145, Canon XII (1930). ATKINSON, WILLS
759 et seq. (1937); Terry v. Smith, 42 N.J. Eq. 504, 8 A. 886 (1887); Pope v.
Sullivan, 156 Mass. 585, 31 N.E. 684 (1892); Cochran v. Elwell, 46 N.J. Eq. 333,
19 A. 672 (1890).
Should it be decided that the words are not mere surplusage, there are two alternatives. They may be treated as creating a trust or as creating a power of appointment in
the devisee or legatee. The latter situation would become meaningful only if the donee
received an interest in the property less than complete ownership, for few, if any, of
the states recognize powers appendant. I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,§ 248 (1936).
15
1n re Park, [1932] I Ch. 580; In re Phillips, [1931] I Ch. 347; In re Dilke,
[ 1921] I Ch. 34. Here the precise words of the deed were:" 'In trust for such person
or persons as the' testator 'with the consent and concurrence in the deed of the said
trustees or trustee (not being less than three) ... shall by deed personally appoint and
in default of and so far as any such appointment shall not extend or operate then as to
the sum of £ I 5,ooo and the estate duty thereon the' testator 'shall by an existing or
future will appoint'" (p. 35).
16
Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (1840); 3 Beav. 257, 49
Eng. Rep. 100 (1841); affd. sub. nom. Drake v. Attorney General, IO Cl. & F. 257,
8 Eng. Rep. 739 (1843); Edie v. Babington, 3 Ir. Ch. 568 (1854); Christine Smith
Kendricks, Exr., 34 B.T.A. 1040 (1936).
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reached by his creditors. 17 The former type of expression normally refers to the
family group of rather restricted number.18 The practical situation is extremely
different here, for the intent of the testator would seem to look to the working
out of some family arrangement closely analogous to that which is usually accomplished by special powers.19 Between these two above described extremes lie an
infinity number of variations. For example a gift of property with a power in
the donee to appoint to anyone in a given state.20 The solution of these intermediate cases would seem to turn upon the somewhat anomolous technique of
construction originally proposed. The .first step is to ascertain whether or not
the donee has by the language and circumstances of the grant such a discretionary control of the property that he may do with it as he pleases. Once the
intent is determined the power is labeled general or special and, if it is the former,
the public policy favoring the rights of creditors intervenes to upset the donor's
plan. When the problem of construction is seen from this point of view, its significance is manifest. Many difficult situations, otherwise productive of serious
injustices, are resolved as questi<;ms of construcfion. 21 Though the principal case
does reflect some indecision, it is an excellent example of just this technique of
analysis and is a real contribution to the subject.
dllen C. Holmes

17 Edie v. Babington, 3 Ir. Ch. 568 (1854); Gold, "The Classification of Some
Powers of Appointment,' 40 MICH, L. REv. 337 at p. 354 (1942).
18 Wetmore v. Henry, 259 III. 80, 102 N.E. 189 (1913); In re Lawler's Will,
215 App. Div. 506, 213 N. Y. S. 723 (1926); Rogers v. Rogers, III N.Y. 228, 18
N.E. 636 (1888); Warburton v. Warburton, 2 Vern. 420, 23 Eng. Rep. 869 (1701),
affd., 4 Brown 1, 2 Eng. Rep. I (1702).
19 In Warburton v. Warburton, 4 Brown I at 2 (1702) the power of appointment
over certain personalty was given to the testator's two daughters in these words: "to be
disposed of by them to the use of themselves, their brothers and sister, or to such of
them, and in such proportion, as they should fudge most fit and conoenient, according
to their needs and necessities." (Italics the court's).
20 ·1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 290 (1936); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §
320, comment d (1940).
21 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, c. 19 (1936).

